I, for one, was left perplexed by Brendan Rodgers choice of a back-five, when I saw the team-sheet ahead of a massive game versus Manchester City at The Etihad. But, a perfect tactical deployment saw Leicester City come out 5-2 victors, let’s dissect his decision-making and why it worked for the Foxes.
Firstly, Leicester City began the game in an unusual 5-4-1, which saw Daniel Amartey start his first Premier League game for two years – as the right centre back out of three, and Dennis Praet play as an unconventional right-midfielder. I thought they’d feel slightly uncomfortable in these positions, especially Praet, who has played as the right-midfielder but in more of a transitional role (i.e. playing as the right central-midfielder and occasionally drifting wide to occupy that space).
The 5-4-1 became two banks of five, as Jamie Vardy sat between both Leicester City central-midfielders – Nampalys Mendy and Youri Tielemans. At first, I thought this gave too much freedom to Nathan Aké and Eric García in the heart of the Citizens defence, but the idea was to neutralise Rodri’s involvement in the game.
Often, Kevin De Bruyne would utilise the Spanish midfielder as a “safety net” option in possession, if he was struggling to find angles to play through the lines. With Vardy man-marking Rodri, this options was taken away, forcing De Bruyne to play forwards at all times – whilst this was happening, all the options were being marked, vigilantly, by Leicester City midfielders and defenders.
Alongside this, the Foxes set-up their 5-4-1 very narrow, a perfect decision against a side with no recognised striker in the starting line-up, and only 19-year-old Liam Delap, son of former Stoke City midfielder, Rory Delap, on the bench. The small pockets of space available to Manchester City were in the wings, for full-backs – Kyle Walker and Benjamin Mendy, and even they were pressured out of playing.
Pep Guardiola isn’t necessarily a fan of crossing the ball into the box, probably due to the heights of his forwards, but his Manchester City side have scored frequent goals from reaching the by-line and cutting the ball back across goal. In fact, during the 2018-19 season, 74% (86/116) of all Man City’s goals came from less than 15 yards out – with 22 coming from inside the six-yard-box.
To create chances such as these, Guardiola asks his full-backs to push high and forces his wingers to invert (play inside the opposition full-back). He also asks his attacking-midfielders – most commonly, De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva to make runs in the same channels. It causes an overload of players and allows the Citizens ample space to cut balls back across the goal. If you re-watch the previous game at The Etihad (from last season), two of their three goals come in this fashion.
To negate this movement and interplay, the Foxes narrow 5-4-1 facilitated either one of the wide centre-backs to engage the space and stop the pass even finding the inverted winger, or one of the central-midfielders would track the runners and force the play in another direction. On the off chance they were able to get in that space, I distinctly remember a Kyle Walker cross, Leicester City covered all the options and normally blocked the cut-back.
It was sensational positional discipline, from a team yet to play a system like this. Brendan Rodgers definitely learnt from the previous fixture – which ended 3-1 in Guardiola’s favour, and understood which areas hurt the King Power side. People say, me included, that Rodgers can sometimes set-up against the “big six” with an inferiority complex, but that wasn’t the case – even with a low block. This was about understanding how to limit your opponents, whilst offering the best way to damage them.
In transition, Leicester played some excellent, acute passes through the first-line of Manchester City’s press. A good example of the intricacy was Mendy’s deaf turn through two pressing midfielders, that released Barnes – before he found Vardy for the first penalty.
Other times, it was exploiting the spaces behind their midfielders. Most notably, Youri Tielemans and Mendy we’re providing the pinpoint passes, as both possess excellent ball-playing ability, with the former adding another to his growing collection of world-class passes – the pre-assist to Vardy’s second.
The 5-4-1 transitioned into a makeshift 4-3-3 attacking unit at times, with Timothy Castagne and Harvey Barnes marauding down the flanks. Praet would push into the centre forming a central three, while Amartey would become a right-back in these moments. I thought the widths were impressively efficient, given the small amount of on-the-ball action they received. Castagne impressed me, again, with a perfect balance of defensive and attacking contributions. While, Barnes showcased his desire to bypass opponents and caused Walker problems all game.
I could go into great detail about each individuals performance, as each player contributed their worth towards the end result, but I’d like to give James Justin a special mention. I’d argue he’s more comfortable playing on the defensive-right, but to facilitate Castagne’s aggressiveness, he’s played on the left and in doing so, dealt with two of the scariest wingers in Europe – Riyad Mahrez and Raheem Sterling. His assurance of his job made it seem like he’s spent his entire career playing in the Premier League – yet it was only the 16th game in the competition for the 22-year-old. Remarkable.
Not to dawdle on the small negatives, but the Foxes did concede two goals from set-pieces. I was of the belief that Rodgers implemented a hybrid system (which involves both zonal and man-marking), but the evidence would suggest a preference for just zonal marking. Personally, I think a hybrid set-up is the best fit in the current era, but, I was adamant Rodgers has selected the wrong formation. So, what do I know?